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KRUPSKI AND RELATION BACK FOR CLAIMS
AGAINST JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
Meg Tomlinson*
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) governs amendments that
change the party or naming of a party in a pleading after the statute of
limitations has run. Many courts have found amendments identifying
defendants previously named as John Doe to be outside the scope of the rule,
holding that a lack of knowledge does not constitute a mistake under Rule 15.
In 2010, however, the U.S. Supreme Court refocused the relation back
inquiry on what the party to be brought in by amendment knew or should
have known within the limitations period—away from what the plaintiff knew
or should have known at the time of filing the complaint. In light of that
decision, a number of federal district courts have reinterpreted Rule 15(c)
and have begun to allow relation back for claims against John Doe
defendants when the requirements of Rule 15(c) are met. This Note examines
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants and concludes that this
new approach is supported by the Supreme Court’s relation back doctrine as
well as the text and purpose of Rule 15(c), and it avoids the tension with Rule
11 that the John Doe rule creates.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2072
I. A BALANCING ACT: RELATION BACK, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS,
AND JOHN DOE PLEADING ........................................................... 2075
A. Rule 15 and Relation Back...................................................... 2075
1. Rule 15(c): Notice, Change of Parties, and Knowledgeof-Mistake Requirements ................................................ 2076
2. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) in Krupski ................................................ 2079
B. Relation Back and Policies Underlying Statutes of
Limitations ............................................................................ 2081
C. John Doe Pleading: From Fictional to Functional ............... 2082
II. PRE-KRUPSKI APPROACHES TO RELATION BACK FOR CLAIMS
AGAINST JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS............................................... 2084
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Georgetown
University. Thanks to Professor Howard Erichson for his guidance and insights and to the
editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their assistance throughout this process. I
would also like to thank my family and friends for their constant support and encouragement.

2071

2072

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

A. Majority Approach: The John Doe Rule................................ 2085
B. Minority Approach: A Focus on the
Defendant’s Knowledge ........................................................ 2089
III. KRUPSKI AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE ........................... 2092
A. A Split over the Breadth of Krupksi’s Impact ......................... 2092
1. The Majority’s Narrow Interpretation of Krupski............ 2092
2. The Minority’s Broader Interpretation of Krupski ........... 2094
B. Textual, Precedential, and Purpose-Based Arguments for the
Narrow and Broad Interpretations of Krupski ..................... 2096
1. Textual Arguments for Each Approach ........................... 2096
2. Precedential Arguments for Each Approach .................... 2099
3. Purpose-Based Arguments for Each Approach ............... 2100
IV. A BETTER WAY ................................................................................ 2102
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2104
INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 2014, Michael Hagen’s widow, Tiffany Hagen, filed a
complaint on behalf of her late husband’s estate after he was beaten to death
by his cellmate at the Snake River Correctional Institute (SRCI).1 Hagen’s
cellmate was a member of a white supremacist gang that had repeatedly
threatened him.2 The complaint alleged that, despite Hagen’s numerous
attempts to inform prison officials that he was being targeted by the gang, the
officials failed to help him.3 Instead, they repeatedly sent him to solitary
confinement; once for refusal to comply with orders to return to his cell where
a cellmate that had threatened him was waiting and again for an altercation
arising out of the conflict with the gang.4 During his second stay in solitary
confinement, Hagen was told that he would be transferred to another prison
after the stay was completed.5 Instead, he was forced to return to general
population and once again share a cell with a member of the white
supremacist gang.6 The following day, Hagen was found beaten and
unconscious in his cell and died the next day from blunt force injuries to his
head.7 Hagen’s murder was the second inmate-on-inmate homicide at SRCI
within a year.8
After Hagen’s death, Tiffany requested information from the Oregon
Department of Corrections (DOC), the DOC’s counsel, and the District
Attorney’s Office to discover the identities of those involved in the incident,
but all cited an the ongoing investigation and refused to provide the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Hagen v. Williams, No. 14-CV-00165, 2014 WL 6893708, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2014).
Id.
Complaint at 5–6, Hagen, 2014 WL 6893708 (No. 14-CV-00165).
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 5.
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information.9 She later filed civil rights claims against a number of named
supervisors and “John Doe” DOC employees at SRCI. She alleged violations
of Hagen’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment on the ground that DOC officials knew of the violence at SRCI
and failed to prevent it.10 After filing the complaint, Tiffany Hagen learned
the identities of the individual officers through discovery.11 By this point,
however, the statute of limitations on the claims had expired, and when she
moved to amend her complaint to identify the previously unnamed officers,
the court held that the claims were time-barred as Tiffany’s lack of
knowledge of the officers’ identities at the time of filing did not constitute a
mistake under Rule 15(c).12
This Note examines whether an amendment identifying a John Doe
defendant can relate back to the original complaint under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii). That is, after the statute of limitations has expired, can a
plaintiff amend the complaint to add the real names of defendants previously
identified as John Doe? Courts considering the question have commonly
found that such amendments are barred by the statute of limitations.13 Many
courts reach the same conclusion reached by the court in Hagen: even if the
prospective defendant had notice of the action within the period for service
of the complaint, the amendment does not relate back to the original
complaint because a lack of knowledge of a prospective defendant’s identity
is not a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii).14 This approach is known as the John Doe rule.15
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,16
however, offers a better approach. Although Krupski did not involve John
Doe defendants, it focused the inquiry under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) on whether
the prospective defendant knew or should have known it would have been
named as a defendant in the original action but for a mistake concerning its
identity, and away from what the plaintiff knew or should have known at the
time the complaint was filed.17 In response to Krupski, a number of federal
district courts have changed their approach and now allow relation back for
claims against John Doe defendants when the other requirements of Rule
15(c) have been met.18
Scholars and courts alike have long noted the strong policy arguments in
favor of an amendment to Rule 15(c) that allows relation back for claims

9. Hagen v. Williams, No. 14-CV-00165, 2014 WL 6893708, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2014).
10. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 8.
11. Hagen, 2014 WL 6893708, at *5.
12. Id. at *5–6.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii); infra Part II.A.
15. Cheatham v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-3015, 2016 WL 6217091, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 25, 2016).
16. 560 U.S. 538 (2010).
17. Id. at 548.
18. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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against John Doe defendants.19 Some have argued for a broader
interpretation of Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement even before Krupski
shifted the relation back inquiry from the plaintiff’s knowledge to the
defendant’s knowledge.20 Others have acknowledged the ambiguity Krupski
created with respect to relation back for claims against John Doe defendants21
or have argued that the decision suggests that Rule 15(c) should not be
interpreted to preclude amendments identifying John Doe defendants.22 This
Note builds on that scholarship by examining recent applications of Krupski
in the context of relation back for claims against John Doe defendants. It
argues that, in light of Krupski, courts should interpret Rule 15(c) to allow
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants where the prospective
defendant had timely notice of the action and knew or should have known
that it was not named because the plaintiff lacked knowledge concerning its
identity.
Part I examines the balance struck between relation back and statutes of
limitations, as well as the use of John Doe pleading in federal court. Next,
Part II describes courts’ approaches to relation back for claims against John
Doe defendants prior to the 2010 Krupski decision. Part III then describes
the majority and minority approaches to this question after Krupski. It
examines the textual, precedential, and purpose-based arguments in favor of
each approach. Finally, Part IV of this Note argues that the minority’s

19. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 202 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing
that an amendment to Rule 15(c) allowing relation back in the event of a mistake or lack of
information concerning the identity of the proper party would bring the rule more in line with
the policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Rebecca S. Engrav, Relation
Back of Amendments Naming Previously Unnamed Defendants Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c), 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1549, 1552–53 (2001) (arguing that the language of Rule
15(c) should be changed to allow relation back when the plaintiff did not know the identity of
the correct defendant); Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe
Defendants: A Study in 1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 799 (2003) (arguing for a
procedural mechanism for § 1983 claims that allows a potential civil rights plaintiff to obtain
formal discovery from the government prior to filing a suit and before the statute of limitations
expires); Brian J. Zeigler et al., A Change to Relation Back, 18 TEX. J. ON C.L & C.R. 181,
182–83 (2013) (arguing for an exception to Rule 15 in excessive force cases only).
20. Steven S. Sparling, Relation Back of “John Doe” Complaints in Federal Court: What
You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1235, 1238–39 (1997) (arguing that
Rule 15(c) preserves § 1983 claims against John Doe defendants where the plaintiff lacked
knowledge of the proper party’s identity).
21. Edward F. Sherman, Amending Complaints to Sue Previously Misnamed or
Unidentified Defendants After the Statute of Limitations Has Run: Questions Remaining from
the Krupski Decision, 15 NEV. L.J. 1329, 1344–47 (2015); Heather Zinkiewicz, Navigating
the Course of Relation Back: Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A. and Standardizing the
Relation-Back Analysis, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1197, 1211–12 (2011); Stacy H. Farmer,
Comment, The United States Supreme Court in Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A. Creates
Additional Ambiguity in the Relation Back Doctrine, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 207, 215–16,
224–26 (2011) (noting that Krupski has created confusion in relation back doctrine and arguing
that the decision should be construed broadly).
22. Robert A. Lusardi, Rule 15(c) Mistake: The Supreme Court in Krupski Seeks to
Resolve a Judicial Thicket, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 317, 338 (2011) (arguing that, after
Krupski, reading Rule 15(c) as barring John Doe amendments is not supported by the text or
the purpose of the Rule).
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rejection of the John Doe rule is supported by the text of Rule 15(c), Supreme
Court precedent, and the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. A BALANCING ACT: RELATION BACK,
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, AND JOHN DOE PLEADING
This Part examines relation back under Rule 15, the connection between
relation back and statutes of limitations, and John Doe pleading. Part I.A.1
explores the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c), and Part I.A.2
describes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule in Krupski. Part I.B
examines the connection between relation back and statutes of limitations.
Part I.C explores the history and use of John Doe pleading.
A. Rule 15 and Relation Back
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend a
pleading to add or change a claim or party in the original complaint.23
Depending on the circumstances, parties can amend pleadings as a matter of
course, with the opposing party’s consent, or with leave of the court. The
rule instructs courts that they should “freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires.”24 This guidance reflects the Rules’ commitment to the
notion that a claim should be decided on its merits rather than on the basis of
mere technicalities.25 In this respect, Rule 15 is emblematic of the shift from
the common law regime, which rarely allowed amendments to pleadings, to
a notice pleading system, which generally only requires that pleadings place
parties on notice of the nature of and the basis for the claims or defenses
asserted.26
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) governs amendments changing parties or the naming of
parties after the relevant statute of limitation has expired. The Rule states
that an amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
[T]he amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against
whom a claim is asserted if [the amendment asserts a claim or defense that
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted
to be set out—in the original pleading] and if, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be
brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.27

23. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)–(2).
24. Id. r. 15(a)(2).
25. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1471, at 587
(3d ed. 2010).
26. Id. § 1471, at 584–85.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
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This subsection is viewed as having three separate requirements: the notice
requirement, the change-of-parties requirement, and the knowledge-ofmistake requirement.28
1. Rule 15(c): Notice, Change of Parties,
and Knowledge-of-Mistake Requirements
The requirement that the defendant receive adequate notice of the original
action has been described as the “linchpin” of relation back.29 This
requirement is set forth in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i), which requires that the party
to be brought in by amendment receive adequate notice of the action within
the period for service under Rule 4(m).30 Rule 4(m) requires service of
summons and the complaint within ninety days of filing.31 Thus, Rule
15(c)(1)(C) requires a defendant to be brought into an action to have received
notice of the action within ninety days of the filing of the original complaint
such that it will not suffer prejudice in defending against the claim on its
merits.32
Notice of the action need not be formal, so long as it is sufficient to ensure
that the party will not be prejudiced in defending against the claims
asserted.33 Formal notice often comes from service of the complaint,34 but
informal notice can take a variety of forms. Some courts require the
prospective defendant to have actual awareness of the suit.35 For example,
in Lembach v. Indiana,36 the court held that, despite the fact that individual
corrections officers may have been aware of the facts underlying an inmate’s
civil rights claim, the amendment adding them as parties did not relate back,
because Rule 15 required that they have notice of the suit itself.37
Other courts, however, have allowed constructive or imputed notice.38
Constructive notice—also known as implied notice—is often found when the
circumstances surrounding the commencement of litigation suggest that the
prospective defendant had reason to expect his potential involvement.39 In

28. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498
29. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); see also Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt
Det. Facility, 334 F. Supp. 2d 114, 128 (D.R.I. 2004).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i).
31. Id. r. 4(m).
32. Prior to Rule 15(c)’s amendment in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the
notice requirement to require notice of the action within the statute of limitations. Schiavone,
477 U.S. at 31. In 1991, the Advisory Committee amended the rule to make clear that notice
must be received within the period for service set forth in Rule 4(m), not within the limitations
period. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. The Advisory
Committee explicitly stated that the rule had been revised to change the result in Schiavone.
Id.
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
34. See Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2010).
35. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.1, at 138 & n.15.
36. 987 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
37. Id. at 1104.
38. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.1, at 138–41, 141 n.16; see, e.g., Davis v.
Corr. Med. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761 (D. Del. 2007).
39. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 195 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc.,40 for example, the Third Circuit found that
a prospective defendant had sufficient notice of the action when he
coincidentally saw a copy of a complaint describing the incident giving rise
to the action and naming his employer and “unknown employee” as
defendants.41
Notice can also be imputed from the originally named party to the party to
be added by amendment.42 Notice can be imputed when a prospective
defendant shares an identity of interest with a named defendant or when a
prospective defendant and a named defendant share counsel.43 Parties have
an identity of interest when their business operations or other activities are so
closely related that the commencement of an action against one provides
notice of the litigation to the other.44 In Schiavone v. Fortune,45 the Supreme
Court validated this method of imputing interest, finding that, when the
complaint provided timely notice to the original defendant, notice can be
imputed to a sufficiently related defendant added by amendment.46
The shared-attorney method permits imputation of notice to a prospective
defendant who is represented by the same attorney as the originally named
defendant.47 This theory recognizes that the attorney for the named
defendant is likely to discuss with the prospective defendant the likelihood
that he may be joined in the action, thus providing the prospective defendant
with notice of both the action and his potential involvement.48 The fact of
shared counsel is sometimes viewed as simply demonstrating an identity of
interest with the originally named party, but courts generally treat the two as
separate methods of imputing notice.49
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is also viewed as having a change-of-parties requirement,
as the rule governs relation back of amendments that “change[] the party or
the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted.”50 Courts differ in
their interpretations of this subsection. Some courts interpret the change-ofparties requirement narrowly and allow only the correction of misnomers or
substitutions of one party for another—not the addition of new parties.51

40. 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977).
41. Id. at 175.
42. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.1, at 138–51.
43. See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195–99.
44. Id. at 197.
45. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
46. Id. at 29.
47. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 197.
48. Id. at 196.
49. Id. at 197.
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.2.
51. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bureaus Inv. Grp., LLC, 309 F.R.D. 654, 659–60 (M.D. Ala.
2015) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 15 advises that amendments relate back only when ‘the
plaintiff redirect[s] an existing claim toward a different party, and drop[s] the original party’”
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, No. CV 0701311-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 5024239, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2011))); Stew Farm, Ltd. v.
Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175–76 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that
relation back is unavailable to amendments naming additional defendants, rather than simply
correcting a misnomer or substituting parties).
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Other courts adopt a broader interpretation that permits amendments that add
or drop parties.52
The final requirement under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is that the party to be added
“knew or should have known” that it would have been named in the original
action “but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”53 Unlike
Rule 15(c)’s notice requirement, which addresses a prospective defendant’s
awareness of the original action, this subsection addresses the prospective
defendant’s awareness that it was not named in the original action solely
because of a mistake concerning its identity.54
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has
elaborated on the requirements for relation back in its notes accompanying
several amendments to the rule. In its note to the 1966 amendment to Rule
15(c), the Advisory Committee observed that relation back problems had
commonly arisen in private actions against officers or agencies of the federal
government.55 The Committee described situations in which plaintiffs
brought suit before the statute of limitations expired but mistakenly named
improper defendants, such as the United States, a recently retired Secretary,
or a nonexistent agency such as the “Federal Security Administration.”56
After learning of their mistakes, the plaintiffs moved to amend their
complaints. Their motions were denied on the ground that the statute of
limitations had expired.57 The Committee characterized these decisions as
“question-begging” and unresponsive to reality, stating that the denial of
relation back under these circumstances robbed the plaintiffs of their
opportunity to prove their cases.58 The Advisory Committee went on to
explain that relation back should be allowed when the party to be brought in
by amendment received timely notice of the action, formal or informal, such
that it would not be prejudiced by defending against the claim, and knew or
should have known that it would have been named in the original action but
for the plaintiff’s mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.59
Neither Rule 15 nor the Advisory Committee notes expressly defines
“mistake” under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), but they do offer some guidance.60
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) clarifies that a mistake under the rule must concern the
proper party’s identity.61 The note to the 1966 amendment describes various
situations in which claimants “mistakenly” named improper government
52. See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 468–69 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting
“change” to encompass additions because “an addition to something is generally regarded as
a change to that thing”); see also Covey v. Assessor, 666 F. App’x 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“Rule 15(c)(1) requires that the party to be added to the action received timely notice . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
54. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.3.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15; id. r. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1991 amendment; id. r.
15 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
61. Id. r. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
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defendants.62 Similarly, the note to the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c)(3)
(now Rule 15(c)(1)(C)) provides an example of a mistake in its description
of an amendment to correct “a formal defect such as misnomer or
misidentification.”63 Thus, despite offering some general examples of
mistakes under Rule 15(c), neither the Advisory Committee’s notes to the
rule’s amendments nor the text of the rule itself clearly defines what qualifies
as a mistake under the rule.64
2. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation
of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) in Krupski
In 2010, the Supreme Court addressed the knowledge-of-mistake
requirement in Krupski.65 In February 2007, Wanda Krupski took a cruise
on the Costa Magica, a ship owned and operated by the Italian corporation
Costa Crociere S.p.A. (“Costa Crociere”).66 While on board, Krupski broke
her leg when she tripped over a cable.67 Krupski sought counsel and, after
attempts at settlement proved unsuccessful, filed a suit in the Southern
District of Florida.68 The suit, which was filed three weeks before the statute
of limitations expired, named Costa Cruise Lines (“Costa Cruise”), the
Florida-based sales and marketing agent for Costa Crociere as a defendant.69
Costa Cruise notified Krupski of Costa Crociere’s existence three times after
the statute of limitations had expired: first in its answer where it asserted that
Costa Crociere was the actual operator of the ship, then in its corporate
disclosure statement, which listed Costa Crociere as an interested party, and
finally in a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Costa Crociere,
not Costa Cruise, was the proper defendant.70 In response to Costa Cruise’s
motion for summary judgment, Krupski produced the information that led
her to believe Costa Cruise was the proper party, including the fact that Costa
Cruise’s website listed its office in Florida as Costa Crociere’s U.S. office.71
The district court granted Costa Cruise’s motion to dismiss but also granted
Krupski leave to file an amended complaint.72
Shortly thereafter, Krupski filed an amended complaint naming Costa
Crociere as the defendant.73 In response, Costa Crociere moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations
because it did not relate back under Rule 15(c).74 The court granted the
62. See id. r. 15(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
63. Id. r. 15(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1991 amendment.
64. See Leonard v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (pointing to the examples offered
by the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1966 to confirm its interpretation of “mistake” in
the context of Rule 15(c)).
65. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010).
66. Id. at 542.
67. Id. at 541.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 543.
70. Id. at 543–44.
71. Id. at 544.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 544–45.
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motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam
opinion.75 The Eleventh Circuit found that, because the information relevant
to the proper party’s identity was contained in Krupski’s cruise ticket, it was
appropriate to impute the knowledge of the proper party’s identity to Krupski
and her counsel.76 In other words, Krupski either knew or should have
known the proper party’s identity before filing suit and therefore should be
treated as having made a deliberate choice to sue one party over another.77
The Eleventh Circuit further held that, even assuming Krupski did not learn
of Costa Crociere as the proper party until Costa Cruise filed its answer,
Krupski’s delay in filing an amended complaint justified the district court’s
denial of relation back, regardless of whether Costa Crociere received
sufficient notice of the action within the limitations period through its shared
counsel and identity of interest with Costa Cruise.78
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that neither of the Eleventh Circuit’s
grounds for denying relation back was supported by the text of Rule 15(c).79
The Court explained that the Eleventh Circuit “chose the wrong starting
point” by focusing on Krupski’s knowledge in determining whether or not
she had made a mistake under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).80 The proper inquiry, the
Court explained, does not focus on what the plaintiff knew or should have
known at the time of filing but instead on whether the prospective defendant
knew or should have known that it would have been named as a defendant
but for a mistake.81 Thus, the plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant only to the
extent that it impacts the prospective defendant’s understanding of whether
its omission from the original complaint was the result of a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.82
The Court also rejected Costa Crociere’s argument that the amended
complaint did not relate back because Krupski unreasonably delayed filing it
after learning of Costa Crociere’s existence. The Court stated that Rule
15(c)(1)(C) “plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation
back, and the amending party’s diligence is not among them.”83 Therefore,
like the plaintiff’s knowledge, a delay in amending is relevant only to the
extent that it impacts the prospective defendant’s knowledge that it would
have been included in the original action but for a mistake concerning its
identity.84
The Court found this reading to be supported by the balance struck within
relation back doctrine between defendants’ interests in repose after the
expiration of the statute of limitations and the Federal Rules of Civil
75. Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895–96 (11th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam), rev’d, 560 U.S. 538.
76. Id. at 895.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 894–95.
79. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 547.
80. Id. at 548.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 553.
84. Id. at 554.
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Procedure’s preference for “resolving disputes on their merits.”85 The Court
noted that a defendant’s interest in repose is implicated most strongly when
he legitimately believes that there has been no attempt to sue him within the
limitations period, but that “repose would be a windfall for a prospective
defendant who understood, or who should have understood, that he escaped
suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff misunderstood a
crucial fact about his identity.”86
In sum, Krupski directed courts to approach questions of relation back by
focusing on a prospective defendant’s awareness that the plaintiff intended
to name it in the action.87 By refocusing this inquiry, the Supreme Court
invalidated plaintiff-focused approaches to relation back, holding that a
plaintiff’s knowledge, or lack thereof, is relevant only insofar as it impacts
the defendant’s awareness that it was meant to be sued.88
B. Relation Back and Policies Underlying Statutes of Limitations
As the Advisory Committee note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 15
observes, relation back is closely connected to the policies underlying
statutes of limitations.89 Statutes of limitations set a time limit for bringing
a claim based on the date the claim accrued and bar claims that are not
brought within that period.90 They are “designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared,” and they are supported by the theory that the right to be
free from the indefinite possibility of defending against a claim eventually
overcomes the right to bring even a meritorious claim.91 Statutes of
limitations reflect a “value judgment concerning the point at which interests
in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by interests in prohibiting
the prosecution of stale ones.”92
Statutes of limitations do not affect merely the “manner and the means” by
which a person can vindicate substantive rights but rather create a substantive
right themselves.93 Aside from the administrative aims of promoting judicial
economy and requiring the diligent pursuit of claims, statutes of limitations
also protect defendants’ rights to a speedy and fair adjudication and to the
security that comes with certainty that one will not be called to defend against

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 550.
Id.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944).
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 2 (2017).
Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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an outstanding claim years in the future.94 These rights are referred to
collectively as a defendant’s right to repose.95
In applying relation back doctrine, courts often note the connection to
statutes of limitations and express apprehension that too liberal an approach
to relation back would allow plaintiffs to circumvent statutes of limitations’
protections of a prospective defendant’s right to repose.96 Thus, courts are
generally protective of statute of limitations defenses because they recognize
the need for defendants to be able to rely on the repose promised by a statute
of limitations.97
C. John Doe Pleading: From Fictional to Functional
John Doe pleading has its roots in English common law, where plaintiffs
used fictional characters to minimize the effects of writ pleading’s rigidity
and to facilitate the pursuit of claims that did not fit into one of the
predetermined categories that were the hallmark of that system.98 In the
American system, John Doe pleading can be traced back to the Field
Code99—David Field’s transformative overhaul of New York’s Code of Civil
Procedure.100 The Field Code allowed a plaintiff that did not know the
defendant’s name to designate that defendant by any name and to amend the
pleading once the name was discovered.101 Thus, the shift to code pleading
marked John Doe’s transformation from a legal fiction into a stand-in for an
actual but unidentified person.102
In contemporary civil litigation, John Doe pleading refers to the practice
of naming intended but yet unidentified defendants as “John Doe.”103 This
practice began in state courts, as many states adopted some form of the Field
Code’s provision allowing unidentified defendants to be given fictitious
names.104 The vast majority of states have adopted some provision for the
use of fictitiously named defendants, whether by statute, in codes of civil

94. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 3.
95. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1234 (2014) (explaining that statutes
of limitations “characteristically embody a ‘policy of repose’” (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. Cent.
R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965))).
96. See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 467–68 (4th Cir. 2007); Powers v.
Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561,
1567 (N.D. Ga. 1992)).
97. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 12 (citing Owen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 533 F.3d
913, 920 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that statutes of limitations are not tolled in the absence of
affirmative action designed to prevent the discovery of the cause of action).
98. Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize
John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 890–91 (1996).
99. Id.
100. For an interesting discussion of the historical significance of the Field Code and its
relation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see generally William Nelson, Remarks: The
History of New York Civil Procedure, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 659 (2013).
101. Rice, supra note 98, at 891–92 & n.27.
102. Id. at 892.
103. See generally David M. Epstein, Annotation, Propriety of Use of Fictitious Name
Defendant in Federal District Court, 139 A.L.R. Fed. 553 (1997).
104. Rice, supra note 98, at 891–92 & n.27.
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procedure, or by judicial decree.105 Only Connecticut, Delaware, and
Louisiana expressly reject John Doe pleading in civil actions.106
In contrast to the many state codes that address Doe pleading, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are notoriously “silent on the matter.”107 Indeed,
Carol Rice has argued that the Federal Rules “simply do not contemplate” a
situation in which a plaintiff does not know the identity of the proper
defendant.108 She notes that, while none of the federal rules address the
matter directly, Rules 10(a) and 17(a) address the matter obliquely.109 Rule
10(a) provides that the title of a complaint “must name all the parties.”110
While this may seem inconsistent with Doe pleading, Rice notes that Rule
10(a) is better interpreted as simply distinguishing the caption from the
remainder of the complaint rather than establishing substantive rules related
to name designation.111
Rule 17(a) states that actions “must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest.”112 The Advisory Committee note to the 1966 amendment
of this provision is the only explicit mention of John Doe parties in the federal
rules.113 The note clarifies that, while the rule recognizes a broad class of
parties as having standing as the real party in interest, the provision should
not be construed to allow filing of an action in the name of a fictitious John
Doe plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations by preserving a claim
should a real victim come forward in the future.114 Rice argues that this rule
requires only that a claim be prosecuted by the party whose interests are
implicated and does not govern the name under which a person must
prosecute the claim.115 Further, both Rule 17(a) and the Advisory
Committee’s note refer to the use of fictional or nonexistent John Doe
plaintiffs;116 neither appears to address the use of John Doe defendants as
pseudonyms for real parties.117

105. Id. at 892 n.27.
106. Id.
107. Donald P. Balla, John Doe Is Alive and Well: Designing Pseudonym Use in American
Courts, 63 ARK. L. REV. 691, 692 (2010); see also Rice, supra note 98, at 892 n.27.
108. Rice, supra note 98, at 887. Rice also notes the other interesting questions that arise
from the Rules’ failure to acknowledge Doe parties, particularly in the context of venue and
jurisdictional disputes. See id.
109. See Balla, supra note 107, at 694.
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a).
111. Rice, supra note 98, at 915.
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1).
113. See id r. 17 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
114. Id.
115. Rice, supra note 98, at 916.
116. Claims by fictitious plaintiffs are most common when the plaintiff wants to remain
anonymous because of the sensitive nature of the claims being asserted. See id. at 908. The
most notable example is in the landmark reproductive rights case Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). Rice, supra note 98, at 909–10. The tensions raised by the use of fictitious names in
this context are different from those raised by the use of fictitious defendants, and the
plaintiff’s privacy interest is often outweighed by practical needs and fairness to the defendant.
Id.
117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a); id. r. 17 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
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Still, despite silence regarding the use of fictitious defendants in federal
court, John Doe defendants are commonly named in complaints.118 While
the use of fictitious defendants is not favored, courts have recognized their
utility as stand-ins for real parties to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to
identify unknown defendants through discovery.119 Thus, fictitious-name
pleading is proper when it is reasonably likely that the discovery process will
reveal the identity of the unknown defendant.120
John Doe defendants play a special role in civil rights litigation.121 A wellknown example comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,122 where the Court
first recognized a cause of action against federal law enforcement agents who
violate an individual’s constitutional rights.123 Bivens’s complaint did not
name the specific federal agents allegedly involved in his unconstitutional
arrest, but the district court ordered service against the agents indicated by
the U.S. Attorney’s records to have been involved in the arrest.124 Thus,
Bivens was able to discover the identities of those involved in his arrest with
the district court’s help.
Bivens is illustrative of the role that John Doe pleading plays for plaintiffs
squaring off against large, institutional defendants, often in civil rights
actions. As scholars have noted, a plaintiff in such a case often faces a catch22: before filing suit, she cannot enlist the court’s help through discovery
requests or orders to discover the identity of unknown defendants, but she
cannot file suit without naming a defendant.125 As Bivens demonstrates, the
ability to sue defendants under fictitious names like John Doe can be critical
to receiving the assistance necessary to discover the unknown defendant’s
identity.126
II. PRE-KRUPSKI APPROACHES TO RELATION BACK
FOR CLAIMS AGAINST JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski, virtually all federal
circuit courts had adopted the position that Rule 15(c) allowed relation back
when a plaintiff misidentified a prospective defendant but not when the
plaintiff lacked knowledge of the prospective defendant’s identity. Courts
thus routinely denied relation back on the ground that a plaintiff’s lack of

118. See generally Epstein, supra note 103.
119. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. City of Erie, 834
F. Supp. 873, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
120. See Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that
plaintiffs may bring suits against unnamed parties when “a good-faith investigation has failed
to reveal the identity of the relevant defendant and there is a reasonable likelihood that
discovery will provide that information”).
121. Rice, supra note 98, at 888–89.
122. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
123. Id. at 395.
124. Id. at 390 n.2.
125. Rice, supra note 98, at 897.
126. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390 n.2.
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knowledge did not constitute a mistake under the rule.127 Only the Third and
Fourth Circuits focused the inquiry on the prospective defendant’s notice of
the action and knowledge of the plaintiff’s mistake,128 and only the Third
Circuit interpreted Rule 15(c) to allow relation back for claims against John
Doe defendants.129
Part II of this Note examines the majority and minority approaches to this
question. Part II.A describes the majority approach to relation back for
claims against John Doe defendants. It discusses the textual and purposebased arguments supporting the majority’s interpretation that a lack of
knowledge does not constitute a mistake under Rule 15(c). Part II.B
describes the slightly more permissive approach adopted by the Third and
Fourth Circuits.
A. Majority Approach: The John Doe Rule
Pre-Krupski courts commonly advanced two lines of reasoning in denying
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants. The first was a simple
textual argument that a lack of knowledge is not a mistake, so a plaintiff who
names a John Doe defendant because she did not know the identity of the
proper party at the time of filing the complaint has not made a “mistake”
under Rule 15(c).130 The second was a purpose-based argument that
emphasized the need to protect defendants’ interests created by statutes of
limitations and was wary of plaintiffs’ use of John Doe pleading and relation
back to circumvent these protections.131
The pre-Krupski courts that prohibited relation back for claims against Doe
defendants under Rule 15(c) relied on two related propositions based on the
rule’s text: First, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) requires the plaintiff to have made a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity, separate from its requirement
that the defendant know that, but for the mistake, it would have been named
in the original action. Second, a lack of knowledge of the identity of the
proper party to be sued is not a mistake concerning the proper party.132
The Seventh Circuit has articulated the basis for this rationale. In
Worthington v. Wilson,133 Richard Worthington sued Peoria Heights, Illinois,
and three unknown police officers, alleging that he was assaulted by the

127. See, e.g., Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004); Foulk v. Charrier,
262 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2001); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 1999),
overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 321–22 (5th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230,
240 (6th Cir. 1996); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1995);
Wilson v. U.S. Gov’t, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994); Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225,
1229 (7th Cir. 1980).
128. See infra Part II.B.
129. See infra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
131. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998); Worthington v.
Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Wood, 618 F.2d at 1229–30).
133. 8 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
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officers during an arrest.134 When Worthington amended his complaint to
substitute officers Wilson and Wall for the unknown officers, the district
court granted Wilson and Wall’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the
statute of limitations had expired.135 In affirming the district court’s
dismissal, the Seventh Circuit explained that Rule 15(c) allows relation back
“only where there has been an error made concerning the identity of the
proper party and where that party is chargeable with knowledge of the
mistake”—not where the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the proper party’s
identity.136 The court further held that, in the absence of such a mistake, it is
irrelevant to the relation back analysis whether the party to be brought in
knew or should have known that the plaintiff intended to name him in the
original complaint, as the mistake requirement is a separate hurdle the
plaintiff must clear before the court undertakes further analysis.137
Worthington could not satisfy the mistake requirement of Rule 15(c), as his
failure to name the defendants was the result of a lack of knowledge regarding
their identity rather than a mistake in their names.138 Thus, there was no
reason to undertake notice or knowledge analysis. This rationale was
advanced by other federal circuit courts in opinions affirming denials of
relation back for the same reasons139 and has come to be known as the “John
Doe rule.”140
Courts adopting the John Doe rule pointed for support to the Advisory
Committee notes to the 1966 and 1991 amendments to Rule 15(c), which
added and clarified the rule’s mistake requirement.141 The 1991 Committee
note clarified that an intended defendant with notice of the action within the
Rule 4(m) period cannot “defeat the action on account of a defect in the
pleading with respect to the defendant’s name” and that plaintiffs are
permitted to amend a complaint to “correct a formal defect such as misnomer
or misidentification.”142 This “misnomer or misidentification” language was
repeated in numerous opinions denying relation back, as courts found that a
lack of knowledge simply was not analogous to a misnomer or
misidentification.143

134. Id. at 1254.
135. Id. at 1255.
136. Id. at 1256 (quoting Wood, 618 F.2d at 1230).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1257.
139. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320–21 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying relation
back for failure to clear Rule 15(c)’s separate “mistake hurdle”); Force v. City of Memphis,
No. 95-6333, 1996 WL 665609, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 1996) (denying relation back, without
examining notice or knowledge, on the ground that a lack of knowledge is not a mistake).
140. Cheatham v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-3015, 2016 WL 6217091, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 25, 2016).
141. See, e.g., Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696–97 (10th Cir. 2004); Wayne v. Jarvis,
197 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338
F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir.
1995); Worthington, 8 F.3d at 1256.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s notes to 1991 amendment.
143. See, e.g., Garrett, 362 F.3d at 696–97; Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 319–20.
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In Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Department,144 for example, the Second
Circuit affirmed the District of Connecticut’s dismissal of Elgin Barrow’s
complaint against six individual officers in the Wethersfield Police
Department as time barred because the amended complaint identifying the
officers, previously named as John Does, was not filed until after the statute
of limitations had expired.145 The Second Circuit interpreted the Advisory
Committee’s inclusion of “misnomer or misidentification” in its note to the
1991 amendment to imply that the rule only allowed the relation back of
amendments necessary to cure such defects.146 Therefore, the plaintiff’s
amendment to correct a lack of knowledge failed to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 15(c).147 The other federal circuit courts have found this
interpretation compelling—before Krupski, the vast majority held that an
amendment correcting a lack of knowledge cannot relate back to the date of
the original complaint because it fails to satisfy the mistake requirement of
Rule 15(c).148
In addition to the textual argument that a lack of knowledge does not
constitute a mistake, these courts also relied on purpose-based reasoning in
applying the John Doe rule—namely, that fictitious-name pleading cannot be
used to undermine the balance struck by Rule 15(c) between a defendant’s
interest in repose and a plaintiff’s interest in pursuing meritorious claims.149
This reasoning reflects two main concerns.
The first concern is an interest in discouraging plaintiffs from waiting until
the last minute to file a complaint. In Wayne v. Jarvis,150 for example, Frank
Wayne filed a pro se § 1983 claim against Georgia’s DeKalb County
Sheriff’s Department and a number of individual sheriffs, including seven
John Doe defendants, after he was attacked by fellow inmates at the DeKalb
County Jail.151 In affirming the district court’s denial of Wayne’s motion to
amend the complaint to name specific deputy sheriffs after the statute of
limitations had run, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the plaintiff’s decision to
wait to file suit until two weeks before the statute of limitations was set to
expire.152 The court described the plaintiff’s problem as one created by his
own failure to comply with a deadline imposed by law and stated that he must
“bear[] the consequences of his own delay.”153 The court further suggested
that, had Wayne filed his complaint earlier, he would have been able to
144. 66 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. Id. at 470.
146. Id. at 469.
147. Id. at 469–70.
148. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
149. See Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004).
150. 197 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338
F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
151. Id. at 1101.
152. Id. at 1104. In affirming the district court’s denial of Wayne’s motion to amend, the
Eleventh Circuit further noted that Wayne’s pro se status did not entitle him to any differential
treatment because the problem was not one of construction, but rather a lack of compliance
with statutorily imposed deadlines. Id. Thus, the practice of liberally construing a pro se
litigant’s complaint would not save his claims from dismissal. Id.
153. Id.
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discover the officers’ identities prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations.154
Courts adopting the John Doe rule also expressed concern that an overly
permissive approach to Rule 15(c) would undermine the purposes served by
statutes of limitations, specifically the protection of defendants’ interest in
repose.155 These courts found this right implicated in amendments
identifying John Doe defendants after the statute of limitations had run.156 In
Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim,157 for example, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg asserted that a prospective defendant not named in a suit
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations is entitled to repose “unless
it is or should be apparent to that person that he is the beneficiary of a mere
slip of the pen, as it were.”158 Allowing amendments identifying defendants
previously named as John Doe, then, would allow plaintiffs to preserve a
claim indefinitely by filing a complaint against a fictitious party without any
requirement that the plaintiff amend the complaint before the expiration of
the statute of limitations.159 For these reasons, courts often found that a broad
interpretation of the mistake requirement in this context would deprive a
defendant of his right to repose without serving the purpose of Rule 15(c),
that is, “to avoid the harsh consequences of a mistake that is neither
prejudicial nor a surprise to the misnamed party.”160
Not all courts adopting the John Doe rule categorically barred relation back
in the context of John Doe pleading. Rather, one principal exception to the
rule emerged where the plaintiff’s inability to identify the John Doe
defendant was attributable to action (or inaction) by the defendant.161 In Byrd
v. Abate,162 often cited as the case creating this exception,163 William Byrd
filed suit against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of
Correction, the Warden and Deputy Warden of Riker’s Island, the Mayor of
New York City, and a John Doe correction officer, after an attack by a fellow
inmate resulted in the loss of Byrd’s left eye.164 Despite Byrd’s numerous
attempts to discover the identity of the John Doe officer on duty at the time
of the attack, Corporation Counsel refused to disclose records until the court
bifurcated the trial for the claims against the individual officer.165 Even after
154. Id.
155. See Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
156. E.g., Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1993).
157. 107 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Ginsburg, J.).
158. Id. at 918. Although this case did not involve John Doe defendants, courts have
applied its reasoning to bar relation back of amendments identifying John Doe defendants.
See, e.g., Cornett v. Weisenburger, No. 1:05CV00101, 2007 WL 321399, at *5 (W.D. Va. Jan.
31, 2007) (finding that naming unidentified Sheriff’s employees as John Doe defendants was
“no mere slip of the pen”).
159. Locklear v. Bergman & Beving AB, 457 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir. 2006).
160. Nassim, 107 F.3d at 918.
161. See, e.g., Byrd v. Abate, 964 F. Supp. 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
162. 964 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
163. See, e.g., DaCosta v. City of New York, No. 1:15-CV-05174, 2017 WL 5176409, at
*16–17 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017) (citing cases that have followed Byrd in finding an exception
to the John Doe rule where defendants withheld identifying information).
164. Byrd, 964 F. Supp. at 142–43.
165. Id. at 143.
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the court ordered bifurcation, Corporation Counsel did not produce
documents identifying Wade Hults as the officer on duty for over six months,
which allowed the statute of limitations for the claims against him to
expire.166 In finding that Byrd’s amended complaint related back, the court
noted that “it was the defense, rather than the plaintiff, who failed to identify
the individual defendant despite Byrd’s requests for that information.”167
The court emphasized that the relevant information was “uniquely within the
knowledge of Corporation Counsel,” who withheld it until after the
limitations period had run.168 Other courts, mainly in the Second Circuit,
now recognize an exception to the John Doe rule when a defendant impedes
a plaintiff’s attempts to discover the proper party’s identity before the
expiration of the statute of limitations.169
B. Minority Approach: A Focus on the Defendant’s Knowledge
As discussed above, the majority of federal circuit courts focused on Rule
15(c)’s mistake language to bar relation back for claims against John Doe
defendants prior to Krupski and found that a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge did
not qualify as a mistake.170 The Third and Fourth Circuits, however, focused
their inquiries on the defendant’s knowledge instead.171
In Varlack, the Third Circuit became the only court of appeals to allow
relation back for claims against John Doe defendants.172 The case involved
an altercation between Varlack and the night manager of an Orange Julius
restaurant who denied Varlack entry to the restaurant when it was closing.173
Varlack alleged that during the fight he fell through a window and sustained
an injury to his arm that required amputation eight inches below the
shoulder.174 Varlack sued Orange Julius and an “Unknown Employee” and
later moved to amend the complaint to identify the employee as Bernette
Cannings after the statute of limitations had expired.175 In holding that
Varlack’s amendment related back, the Third Circuit noted that Cannings had
previously testified that he was aware of the suit and knew that Unknown
Employee referred to him.176 The court found that this knowledge was
sufficient to satisfy Rule 15(c)’s requirement that the party to be brought in

166. Id.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Peralta v. Donnelly, No. 6:04-CV-06559, 2009 WL 2160776, at *4–5
(W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2009); Murphy v. West, 533 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316–17 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
170. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
171. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 610 (4th Cir. 2010); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc.,
494 F.3d 458, 471–72 (4th Cir. 2007); Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 194 (3d
Cir. 2001) (denying relation back on the ground that the defendant did not receive timely
notice).
172. Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 175.

2090

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

by amendment know that, but for a mistake, it would have been named in the
original action.177
Subsequently, in Singletary v. Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections,178 Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit noted that the weight
of authority in other federal circuit courts did not favor such an interpretation
but suggested that the John Doe rule was subject to both epistemological and
semantic challenges.179 The Singletary court instead affirmed the district
court’s refusal to allow an amendment identifying John Doe defendants on
the ground that the parties to be brought in by amendment had not received
timely notice of the action, thus avoiding having to address what the court
described as “sticky issues” relating to the relation back of claims against
John Doe defendants.180 Despite denying relation back under the
circumstances, however, the court dedicated a long footnote to arguing that
the Rules Advisory Committee should amend Rule 15(c) to make clear that
it permits the relation back of amendments identifying John Doe
defendants.181
The Fourth Circuit similarly focused its inquiry on the defendant’s
knowledge, while continuing to preclude relation back for claims against
John Doe defendants. In Goodman v. Praxair, Inc.,182 the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s amendment adding
Praxair Services, Inc., Praxair, Inc.’s wholly owned subsidiary, on the ground
that it was barred by the statute of limitations.183 The court rejected the
defendants’ argument that the plaintiff had not made a mistake under Rule
15(c). It held that the lower court’s interpretation of the rule improperly
focused on the type of mistake without fully considering notice and prejudice
to the party to be brought in by amendment.184 Specifically, the court held
that the relation back inquiry “does not concern itself with the amending
party’s particular state of mind except insofar as he made a mistake” but
rather “focuses on the notice to the new party and the effect on the new party
that the amendment will have” and that the mistake language is confined to
describing the prospective defendant’s notice and understanding.185
The Fourth Circuit also found that the mistake requirement is not the
proper vehicle for addressing concerns about plaintiffs circumventing
statutes of limitations by filing an action against fictitious defendants with
the plan of amending after the opportunity for discovery.186 Instead, the court
177. Id.
178. 266 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001).
179. Id. at 200.
180. Id. at 201.
181. See id. at 201 n.5.
182. 494 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2007).
183. Id. at 475.
184. Id. at 469.
185. Id. at 469–70. The court’s use of the term notice here is slightly unclear, as its
assertion that “[t]he ‘mistake’ language is textually limited to describing the notice that the
new party had, requiring that the new party have expected or should have expected, within the
limitations period, that it was meant to be named a party in the first place” appears to refer
both to the notice requirement and to the knowledge-of-mistake requirement. Id. at 471.
186. Id. at 470, 473.
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found that the notice and prejudice requirements adequately protect a
defendant’s interest in repose.187 Thus, because Praxair Services, Inc. knew
or should have known within the limitations period that it was the proper
party to the suit and had suffered no prejudice, the amendment adding it as a
party related back to the original complaint.188 The Goodman court,
however, explicitly stated that this approach to relation back would continue
to preclude relation back for claims against John Doe defendants as such
amendments would likely result in prejudice to the new party or would be
unable to satisfy the knowledge-of-mistake requirement.189
In Robinson v. Clipse,190 the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this approach to
relation back.191 Plaintiff Tyrone Robinson filed a pro se complaint against
the South Carolina Department of Public Safety and Highway Patrol after
being shot by Trooper Joseph Franklin Clipse at the termination of a highspeed chase.192 The district court originally dismissed the action on the
ground that the department could not be held liable under a theory of
respondeat superior and that qualified immunity prevented Trooper Clipse
from being sued in his individual capacity.193 The Fourth Circuit vacated
that order,194 but on remand the district court granted Clipse’s motion for
summary judgment on the ground that Robinson’s claims against him,
asserted for the first time in the amended complaint, were barred by the
statute of limitations.195 Noting its rejection of a formalistic interpretation of
Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement in Goodman, the court explained that the
mistake language simply described the new party’s notice or knowledge.196
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Robinson’s
amended complaint naming Trooper Clipse as a defendant after the statute of
limitations had run.197 Because Clipse had notice within the limitation period
that he was the party Robinson intended to sue, the Fourth Circuit explained,
the amendment related back under Rule 15(c).198
While neither Goodman nor Robinson involved an amendment identifying
a defendant previously sued as John Doe, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, like
that of the Third Circuit, differed meaningfully from the approach taken by
the majority of the federal circuit courts, which adopt the John Doe rule. The

187. Id. at 470–71.
188. Id. at 475.
189. Id. at 471.
190. 602 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2010).
191. Id. at 610.
192. Id. at 606.
193. Id. at 606–07.
194. Robinson v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 222 F. App’x. 330, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2007).
The Fourth Circuit found that the district court improperly resolved a factual issue with respect
to qualified immunity. It further held that by concluding that Trooper Clipse was entitled to
qualified immunity, the district court effectively made Clipse a party, as the qualified
immunity defense is only available to a defendant sued in his individual capacity. Id. at 332
n.*.
195. Robinson, 602 F.3d at 608.
196. Id. at 610.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Third and Fourth Circuits focused on the prospective defendant’s notice and
knowledge rather than on whether the amendment sought to rectify the
plaintiff’s misidentification or lack of knowledge.199 Thus, the Third and
Fourth Circuits interpreted the mistake requirement as inquiring into what the
prospective defendant knew about the action and his intended involvement
in it, rather than as a distinct and dispositive factor separate from any analysis
of the prospective defendant’s notice or knowledge.200 The Supreme Court
validated this approach to relation back in Krupski when it held that the
knowledge-of-mistake requirement in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) addresses the
defendant’s knowledge that it would have been named in the original action
but for a mistake concerning its identity, and that the plaintiff’s knowledge is
relevant only insofar as it affects the defendant’s understanding.201
III. KRUPSKI AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE
After Krupski, courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether the
decision mandates a new approach to relation back for claims against John
Doe defendants. Disagreement exists over Krupski’s applicability to relation
back for such claims. This Part explores the disagreement and the arguments
advanced in favor of the majority and minority approaches.
A. A Split over the Breadth of Krupksi’s Impact
While Krupski did not involve claims against John Doe defendants,
scholars have noted that the Court’s reasoning in the decision is likely
relevant to such claims, as the Court’s focus on the prospective defendant’s
knowledge appears to conflict with an approach to relation back that focuses
primarily on determining whether the plaintiff’s knowledge, or lack thereof,
can be considered a mistake.202 While some courts have held that Krupski
controls in the context of John Doe defendants, most continue to apply the
John Doe rule.203 This tension has led to a split, both across circuits and
between district courts within the same circuit, as to the proper interpretation
of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) in the context of claims against John Doe defendants.
1. The Majority’s Narrow Interpretation of Krupski
Since Krupski, only three federal circuit courts have directly considered
the decision’s impact on the John Doe rule, and each has determined that,
even in light of the decision, Rule 15(c) continues to preclude relation back
for claims against John Doe defendants.204 The Sixth Circuit was the first to

199. See supra notes 172–77, 183–85 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
201. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010).
202. See Sherman, supra note 21, at 1346 (noting that the “lack of knowledge is not a
mistake” rationale is hard to justify after Krupski); Zinkiewicz, supra note 21, at 1211–12.
203. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
204. See infra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. The circuits that have directly
considered Krupski’s impact are the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. Two Seventh Circuit
cases have also applied the John Doe rule after Krupski, but district courts in the circuit have
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address the question in 2012 and held in an unreported opinion that even after
Krupski, Rule 15(c) did not allow relation back for identification of
defendants originally named as John Doe.205 Similarly, the Second Circuit
has also retained its pre-Krupski approach by holding that amendments
identifying John Doe defendants do not correct a mistake of fact and, thus,
do not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).206 In 2017, the Eighth Circuit held
that naming a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” and that the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Krupski does not expand the definition of mistake to
include a lack of knowledge.207
As discussed above, courts adopting the John Doe rule do not deny relation
back whenever a plaintiff does not know the identity of all intended
defendants.208 Wyatt v. Owens209 illuminates the nuance of this approach.
There, Michael Owens alleged excessive force during his arrest in a pro se
§ 1983 action against officers Johnny Owens, Allen Shelton, William Harris,
Scott Wyatt, and M.D. Pickeral.210 Defendants Harris and Pickeral
succeeded in moving for summary judgment as they each had been
misidentified by Wyatt at the time he filed his complaint and neither was
actually present at Wyatt’s arrest.211 After retaining counsel, Wyatt filed an
unopposed motion to amend his complaint under Rule 15 to replace Harris
and Pickeral with officers Thomas Nicholson and Robert Wolsham.212
Nicholson and Wolsham moved for summary judgment on the theory that the
claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations; because
Wyatt’s error did not qualify as a “mistake” under Rule 15(c), the claims
could not relate back to the original complaint.213 In denying the motion, the
court found that Wyatt’s misidentification of the officers was the
“quintessential type of mistake contemplated by Rule 15(c).”214 Because
Wyatt incorrectly named two actual officers, instead of using fictitious names
as placeholders, his misidentification qualified as a mistake under the rule.215
In addition to the exception described in Part II.A.3 above, courts adopting
the John Doe rule have begun to recognize another exception to the John Doe
rule since Krupski. This exception allows relation back for claims against
John Doe defendants under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), which permits relation back
when the law providing the statute of limitations allows relation back for such

found that those cases are not controlling and neither involved unidentified defendants. See
infra note 219.
205. Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x. 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012).
206. See Scott v. Village of Spring Valley, 577 F. App’x. 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2014); Hogan v.
Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit’s decision in Scott, however,
was a ruling by summary order and, thus, lacked precedential effect.
207. Heglund v. Aitkin County, 871 F.3d 572, 579–81 (8th Cir. 2017).
208. See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text.
209. 317 F.R.D. 535 (W.D. Va. 2016).
210. Id. at 538.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 540.
215. Id. at 540–41.
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claims.216 In the context of state claims being tried in federal court or of
claims arising under § 1983, which derive their statutes of limitations from
state law, courts applying this exception look to the rules of procedure in the
relevant state.217 Thus, in the event that the state rules of civil procedure
allow relation back for claims against John Doe defendants, relation back
may be permitted pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1)(A).218
2. The Minority’s Broader Interpretation of Krupski
In contrast to the approach described above, a number of district courts,
largely in the Seventh Circuit,219 have found that, by refocusing the inquiry
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), Krupski marked a “doctrinal change in the law of
relation back.”220 These courts apply Krupski to allow relation back for
amendments identifying John Doe defendants.221 In addition to finding this
approach supported by both the Supreme Court’s guidance in Krupski and by
the text of Rule 15(c), these courts are also persuaded that this interpretation
of Rule 15(c) is more consistent with the purpose of the rule.222 Other courts
have applied Krupski in finding the mistake requirement satisfied but denied
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(A).
217. 3 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 § 9.2 (4th ed. 2017).
218. See Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518–20 (2d Cir. 2013); Palacio v. City of
Springfield, 25 F. Supp. 3d 163, 168–70 (D. Mass. 2014).
219. In Haroon v. Talbott, No. 16-CV-04720, 2017 WL 4280980 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017),
the court stated that the Seventh Circuit had not expressly considered Krupski’s impact on the
John Doe rule, as the only two cases to even address the question indirectly were not
controlling because one addressed the issue only in dictum, the other was unpublished, and
neither addressed Krupski’s impact on cases involving unidentified defendants, id. at *5 (citing
Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); Flournoy v. Schomig, 418 F. App’x.
528, 532 (7th Cir. 2011)). This may explain why district courts in the Seventh Circuit are
more likely than others to adopt this approach.
220. White v. City of Chicago, No. 14 cv 3720, 2016 WL 4270152, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
15, 2016).
221. While not a comprehensive list, the following represent a significant number of the
cases that have adopted this approach: Moore v. Cuomo, No. 14 C 9313, 2017 WL 3263483,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2017); White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *18; Williams v. City of Chicago,
No. 14 C 6959, 2017 WL 1545772, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2017); Clair v. Cook County, No.
16 C 1334, 2017 WL 1355879, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2017); Klinger v. City of Chicago,
No. 15-CV-1609, 2017 WL 736895, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2017); Ayoubi v. Basilone, No.
14 C 0602, 2016 WL 6962189, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2016); Cheatham v. City of Chicago,
No. 16-cv-3015, 2016 WL 6217091, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2016); Karney v. City of
Naperville, No. 15 C 4608, 2016 WL 6082354, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016); Tomlin v.
Gafvert, No. CV 13-1980-PHX-SMM (ESW), 2015 WL 4639242, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4,
2015); Foster v. Cerro Gordo County, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1059 (N.D. Iowa 2014); Smith v.
City of New York, 1 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.
Supp. 2d 656, 666 (W.D. Pa. 2012); Solivan v. Dart, 897 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2012);
McKnight v. Iceberg Enters. LLC, No. 9:10-cv-03248-DCN, 2012 WL 2418870, at *3–4
(D.S.C. June 26, 2012); Abdell v. City of New York, 759 F. Supp. 2d 450, 457 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Jamison v. City of York, No. 1:09-cv-1289, 2010 WL 3923158, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
30, 2010); McDaniel v. Maryland, No. RBD-10-00189, 2010 WL 3260007, at *5–6 (D. Md.
Aug. 18, 2010); Smetzer v. Newton, No. 1:10-CV-93-JVB, 2010 WL 3219135, at *10 (N.D.
Ind. Aug. 13, 2010); Edwards v. Middlesex County, No. 08-Civ 06359 (JAP), 2010 WL
2516492, at *5 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010).
222. See, e.g., White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *18.
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relation back on the ground that the prospective defendants did not have
adequate notice of the suit.223 Still other courts, without deciding the issue
definitively, have suggested that Krupski undermines the John Doe rule.224
Courts adopting this approach do not allow relation back any time a
plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to identify John Doe defendants. Rather,
these courts recognize a difference between amendments that identify
prospective defendants that were originally identified with reasonable
specificity in the complaint and those where John Doe defendants seemed to
serve as placeholders not tied to any identifiable party.225 In McKnight v.
Iceberg Enterprises LLC,226 for example, the district court allowed the
plaintiff to amend her complaint after the limitations period had expired to
identify Mid-Continent Distributors, Inc. and Mid-Continent Distributors,
LLC as John Doe Chair Manufacturer and John Doe Chair Distributor.227 In
explaining why the Fourth Circuit’s pronouncement in Goodman that
“naming Doe defendants self-evidently is no mistake [under Rule 15]” would
not preclude relation back, the court noted that Mid-Continent received
service of the complaint within the Rule 4(m) period, that McKnight’s
complaint stated that she would amend the complaint when the name of the
defendant-manufacturer was discovered, and that Mid-Continent was on
notice that McKnight was injured when she sat on the chair.228 Thus, the
court reasoned, “the liberal amendment policies of the Federal Rules
favor[ed] relation back” under the circumstances.229
Similarly, in Solivan v. Dart,230 the court allowed relation back of an
amendment identifying John Doe corrections officers in reckless indifference
claims arising out of an incident where Solivan, the only Hispanic inmate in
a majority African American tier of Cook County Department of Corrections
maximum security housing, was severely beaten by African American
inmates and left untended by corrections staff for nearly three hours.231 The
court noted that Solivan displayed diligence by timely filing his complaint,
repeatedly seeking the names of the John Doe officers, and identifying the
John Does as specifically as he could “based on their shift times on specific
223. See Covey v. Assessor, 666 F. App’x. 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2016); Haroon, 2017 WL
4280980, at *9.
224. See, e.g., DaCosta v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-5174, 2017 WL 5176409, at *16
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017) (“The guidance of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals [regarding
relation back in the context of a John Doe pleading] after Krupski . . . seems too narrow . . . .”);
Ryan v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 9762, 2016 WL 6582570, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2016);
Roland v. McMonagle, No. 12 Civ. 6331 (JPO), 2014 WL 2861433, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June
24, 2014) (stating that “to the extent that Barrow defines ‘mistake’ in terms of what the
plaintiff—rather than the prospective defendant—knew or should have known, it has been
abrogated by [Krupski]”); Brown v. Deleon, No. 11 C 6292, 2013 WL 3812093, at *4–6 (N.D.
Ill. July 18, 2013); Callicut v. Scalise, No. 1:11-CV-1282 (LEK/RFT), 2013 WL 432913, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2013).
225. See infra notes 227–39 and accompanying text.
226. No. 9:10-cv-03248-DCW, 2012 WL 2418870 (D.S.C. June 26, 2012).
227. Id. at *4.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 897 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
231. Id. at 698.
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dates and at specific posts in the [division] and based on the incident log
number for his injuries.”232 Given this specificity, it was clear that the
officers identified in this way knew or should have known that Solivan
intended to name them in his suit.233 Unlike a plaintiff asserting claims
against named defendants and numerous unidentifiable John Does,234
Solivan used John Doe designations to refer as specifically as possible to
intended defendants that he was not yet able to identify.235
In contrast, in Haroon v. Talbott,236 the court denied relation back for an
amendment identifying a John Doe defendant who was omitted as a party
from the caption of the complaint, merely described in the complaint’s body
as an unknown driver and agent of the named defendant, and excluded from
the complaint’s request for relief against the named defendant.237 The court
found that while relation back is not categorically unavailable to a plaintiff
who lacks the knowledge of the proper party’s identity, relation back will be
denied when the content of the original complaint and the plaintiff’s postfiling conduct create the impression that the initial failure to name the
prospective defendant was intentional.238 Thus, courts adopting this more
permissive approach to relation back after Krupski use Rule 15(c)’s notice
and knowledge requirements as a mechanism for filtering claims against John
Doe defendants that properly relate back from those that do not.239
B. Textual, Precedential, and Purpose-Based Arguments
for the Narrow and Broad Interpretations of Krupski
Courts adopting both interpretations of Krupski’s impact on relation back
doctrine have advanced various arguments in favor of each approach. This
Part examines the textual, precedential, and purpose-based arguments
supporting both interpretations.
1. Textual Arguments for Each Approach
After Krupski, some courts continue to rely on pre-Krupski interpretations
of Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement without addressing Krupski, while
others explicitly distinguish the plaintiff’s position in Krupski from that of a
plaintiff naming John Doe defendants.240 Under either approach, the

232. Id. at 702.
233. Id.
234. See generally Krekelberg v. Anoka County, No. 13-3562, 2016 WL 4443156 (D.
Minn. Aug. 19, 2016) (listing numerous parties as well as John and Jane Does 1 through 1000
and Entity Does 1 through 50).
235. Solivan, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
236. No. 16-cv-04720, 2017 WL 4280980 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).
237. Id. at *8.
238. Id. at *7–9.
239. See id. at *9.
240. Compare Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Krupski in a
footnote but only for the proposition that Rule 15(c) had been renumbered without substantive
change since 1995), with Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x. 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012)
(asserting that “Krupski’s problem is not Smith’s problem”).
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underlying rationale is consistent with pre-Krupski interpretations of the
mistake requirement: a lack of knowledge simply is not a mistake.241
These courts retain the reasoning articulated in pre-Krupski decisions and
continue to interpret Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement as excluding
situations in which a plaintiff lacked knowledge concerning the proper
party’s identity.242 In Heglund, for example, the Eighth Circuit found that
Krupski did not justify an expansion of “mistake” to include the naming of
John Doe defendants as the Court in Krupski, unlike those considering
amendments identifying John Doe defendants, “was not confronted with an
intentional error by a plaintiff that is incompatible with the very definition[]
of ‘mistake.’”243 Courts adopting this approach continue to hold that
satisfying the mistake requirement is an independent and necessary step
before analyzing whether the prospective defendant knew it should have been
named in the original complaint.244 Thus, these courts find that Krupski has
not expanded Rule 15(c) to capture a situation where a plaintiff lacks the
knowledge of the proper party’s identity.245
The main textual justification for this approach comes from the plain
meaning of the word “mistake,” which courts adopting the John Doe rule
define as a “misunderstanding, wrong decision, or inadvertent wrong
action.”246 These courts rely on both lay and legal dictionaries in reaching
the conclusion that “mistake” implies a lack of intentionality that is simply
irreconcilable with an intentional use of a John Doe designation to accurately
convey a lack of knowledge of a party’s identity.247 Thus, these courts reason
that, regardless of the policy arguments in favor of permitting relation back
under these circumstances, the text of the rule simply does not permit such
an interpretation.248
A number of district courts, however, find that Krupski has mandated a
reinterpretation of Rule 15(c)’s mistake requirement. In White v. City of
Chicago,249 Willie White, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint under § 1983
alleging violations of his constitutional rights after an unknown police officer
pushed him down a flight of stairs while handcuffed, causing him to separate
his shoulder.250 Although White received some records from the City of
241. See, e.g., Lelieve v. Orosa, No. 10-23677-CIV, 2011 WL 5103949, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 27, 2011).
242. See supra Part II.A.
243. Heglund v. Aitkin County, 871 F.3d 572, 580 (8th Cir. 2017).
244. See infra Part III.B.2.
245. See, e.g., Strong v. City of Eugene, No. 6:14-cv-01709-AA, 2015 WL 2401395, at *4
(D. Or. May 19, 2015); Bender v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 4386(LTS)(GWG), 2015
WL 524283, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015); Asten v. City of Boulder, No. 08-cv-00545-PABMEH, 2010 WL 5464298, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2010).
246. Heglund, 871 F.3d at 580 (quoting Mistake, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 772 (2002)); see also Bostick v. McGuire, No. 6:15-cv-01533-Orl-37GJK, 2016
WL 2811246, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing Mistake, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014)).
247. Heglund, 871 F.3d at 580.
248. Id. at 581.
249. No. 14 cv 3720, 2016 WL 4270152 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2016).
250. Id. at *1.
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Chicago in response to discovery requests, these did not reveal the identity
of the officer that pushed him down the stairs.251 After receiving courtappointed counsel and at the court’s suggestion, White filed a second
amended complaint adding as defendants all of the officers that appeared in
the records White had received.252 While this saved White’s § 1983 claims
from being time barred, the individual defendants moved to dismiss certain
state law claims that had expired five months before the amended complaint
was filed.253
In determining whether these state claims would relate back, the court
relied heavily on Krupski. The court found that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) could
not be interpreted to preclude relation back for claims against John Doe
defendants after Krupski because such an interpretation would rely on the
plaintiff’s knowledge without examining the defendant’s knowledge—an
approach that had been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.254 The
court noted that, while Krupski involved a plaintiff’s knowledge of a party’s
existence, claims against John Doe defendants involve a lack of knowledge
of the proper party’s identity.255 Still, the court reasoned, there was no reason
to assume that the Supreme Court would treat the two situations differently
because Krupski had rejected as the central relation back inquiry not only
what the plaintiff knew but what the plaintiff should have known.256 For
support, the court further pointed to the Krupski court’s definition of mistake,
which included not only error, misconception, or misunderstanding, but also
inadequate knowledge and inattention.257 The court found the reference to
“inadequate knowledge” to support the extension of Krupski’s reasoning to
the lack of knowledge resulting in John Doe designations.258 Other courts
have similarly found that Krupski’s interpretation of Rule 15(c) supports the
notion that a lack of knowledge concerning a defendant’s identity can
constitute a mistake.259
The main textual justification for this approach comes from Krupski’s
definition of mistake in conjunction with its guidance that the proper inquiry
under relation back is whether the prospective defendant knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake, the plaintiff would have named him in the
original action—not what the plaintiff knew at the time of filing the
251. Id. at *3.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at *16.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (citing Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 506 U.S. 538, 548–49 (2010)).
258. Id.
259. Williams v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 6959, 2017 WL 1545772, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 28, 2017); Klinger v. City of Chicago, No. 1:15-CV-1609, 2017 WL 736895, at *5–6
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2017); Smith v. City of New York, 1 F. Supp. 3d. 114, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Brown v. Deleon, No. 11 C 6292, 2013 WL 3812093, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2013); Solivan
v. Dart, 897 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Abdell v. City of New York, 759 F. Supp.
2d 450, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“After Krupski, it is clear that a ‘mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity’ under Rule 15(c) includes lack of knowledge regarding the conduct or liability
of that party.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii))).
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complaint.260 These courts point to the inclusion of “inadequate knowledge”
in Krupski’s definition of mistake as an indication that “mistake” under Rule
15(c) can include a lack of knowledge concerning the proper party’s
identity.261 In light of this definition of mistake, these courts find that the
interpretation articulated in Heglund fails to follow the text of Rule 15(c), as
well as the Supreme Court’s guidance, by continuing to employ a plaintifffocused inquiry and relying on an underinclusive definition of mistake.262
2. Precedential Arguments for Each Approach
Courts continuing to apply the John Doe rule have found that the decision
does not undermine pre-Krupski precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1) as
having a mistake requirement separate from its notice and knowledge
requirements.263 In Terry v. Chicago Police Department,264 for example, the
district court in the Northern District of Illinois cited Worthington and other
pre-Krupski cases from the Seventh Circuit to support the proposition that
“Rule 15(c)(1) contains a ‘mistake’ requirement that is independent from the
determination of whether the new party knew that the action would be
brought against it.”265 Therefore, the court held, because the plaintiff’s lack
of knowledge of the proper defendant’s identity did not constitute a mistake,
relation back was unavailable.266 The court further held that the plaintiff’s
reliance on Krupski was misguided, as the plaintiff did not “make the type of
mistake of fact at issue in [Krupski].”267 Thus, the absence of such a mistake
ended the inquiry, and analysis under the notice and knowledge portions of
Rule 15(c)(1) was irrelevant.268
Similarly, in Dominguez v. City of New York,269 the district court in the
Eastern District of New York declined to interpret Krupski as overruling the
Second Circuit’s precedent in Barrow that a lack of knowledge did not
constitute a mistake.270 The court explained that “Krupski merely picks up
where Barrow left off. Barrow asked whether a mistake has been committed;
Krupski assumes the presence of a mistake and asks whether it is covered by
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).”271 Like the court in Terry, the court in Dominguez
separated Rule 15(c)’s mistake analysis from its notice and knowledge
analysis and found that Krupski is relevant only to the latter.272

260. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548.
261. Haroon v. Talbott, No. 1:16-cv-04720, 2017 WL 4280980, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2017); see also White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *16.
262. White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *7.
263. See supra Part III.B.1.
264. 200 F. Supp. 3d 719 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
265. Id. at 724–25.
266. Id. at 726.
267. Id. at 725.
268. Id. (citing Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1998)).
269. No. 10 Civ. 2620(BMC), 2010 WL 3419677 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).
270. Id. at *3.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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Courts rejecting the John Doe rule in light of Krupski, however, have found
that this pre-Krupski precedent is no longer good law.273 In White, for
example, the court rejected the argument that Krupski does not affect prior
decisions precluding relation back for claims against John Doe defendants
because such claims involve a lack of knowledge rather than a factual
mistake.274 The court reasoned that the Seventh Circuit had already rejected
such a distinction in Hall v. Norfolk Southern Railway275 when it held that
the distinction between a plaintiff’s ignorance of and misunderstanding about
a party’s liability for an injury creates no meaningful difference in the relation
back analysis as neither is a mistake concerning the defendant’s identity
under Rule 15(c).276 The White court further pointed to the Seventh Circuit’s
assertion in Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Technologies Racing Corp.277 that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski had “cut the ground out from under”
Hall’s view that a misunderstanding could not constitute a mistake under
Rule 15(c). The court reasoned that the decision similarly must have cut the
ground out from under an interpretation that ignorance could not constitute a
mistake. It held that the rationale underlying the exclusion of either from the
definition of “mistake” ultimately depends improperly on the amending
party’s knowledge rather than that of the prospective defendant.278 Thus, the
White court found that Krupski undermined Seventh Circuit precedent that
mandated adherence to the John Doe rule.279 Other courts have also found
that Krupski undermines John Doe rule precedent by rejecting distinctions
within relation back analysis that rely on the plaintiff’s knowledge and not
that of the prospective defendant.280
3. Purpose-Based Arguments for Each Approach
After Krupski, courts retaining the majority John Doe rule continue to
advance the purpose-based arguments in favor of the approach set forth in
Wayne, Nassim, and other pre-Krupski decisions.281 These courts maintain
that plaintiffs who wait to file their complaints until several days before the
expiration of the statute of limitations and are unable to discover the John
273. See infra notes 274–80 and accompanying text.
274. White v. City of Chicago, No. 14 cv 03720, 2016 WL 4270152, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
15, 2016).
275. 469 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2006).
276. White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *15 (citing Hall, 469 F.3d at 596).
277. 638 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2011).
278. White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *16 (citing Joseph, 638 F.3d at 559).
279. Id. at *18.
280. DaCosta v. City of New York, No. 1:15-CV-5174, 2017 WL 5176409, at *16
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017) (finding that the “guidance of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
after Krupski—and the district courts following that court’s reasoning—seems too narrow”);
Moore v. Cuomo, No. 14 C 9313, 2017 WL 3263483, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2017); Smith v.
City of New York, 1 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that “Krupski overrules
Barrow in the context of amended pleadings that add previously unidentified defendants”);
Abdell v. City of New York, 759 F. Supp. 2d 450, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that an
examination of the Krupski opinion invalidates prior narrow understanding of a Rule 15(c)
“mistake”).
281. See supra notes 149–60 and accompanying text.
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Does’ identities within the limitation period should be left to bear the
consequences of their own delay.282 Additionally, courts adopting the John
Doe rule argue that this approach is supported by the purpose of Rule 15(c),
which protects defendants’ interest in repose by preventing plaintiffs from
circumventing statutes of limitations through the use of John Doe
designations.283
The courts that have changed their approach to relation back in light of
Krupski, however, find not only that Krupski mandates a reinterpretation of
“mistake” but also that such a reinterpretation is supported by the purposes
of Rule 15, and the policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
more broadly.284 In Haroon, for example, the court pointed to Krupski’s
statement of the purpose of relation back as “balanc[ing] the interests of the
defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference
expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in
particular, for resolving disputes on their merits.”285 The court also focused
on Krupski’s observation that Rule 15(c) protects a prospective defendant’s
legitimate interest in repose but that repose “would be a windfall for a
prospective defendant who understood, or should have understood, that he
escaped suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff
misunderstood a crucial fact about his identity.”286
In light of this guidance from Krupski, the Haroon court concluded that
interpreting Krupski to allow relation back for claims against John Doe
defendants, provided that the notice and knowledge requirements are met,
best serves the purposes of relation back doctrine by striking the appropriate
balance between a defendant’s interest in repose and the Federal Rules’
preference for resolving disputes on their merits.287 The court also noted that
the plaintiff-focused reasoning advanced to support the continued application
of the John Doe rule unjustifiably treats plaintiffs with inadequate knowledge
much more harshly than plaintiffs who simply identify the wrong defendant
in the original complaint.288 Finally, courts adopting this approach reason
that, by focusing on the defendant’s knowledge, the approach does not
undermine prospective defendants’ legitimate interest in repose as they are
in the same position as a defendant sued within the limitations period and
suffer no harm by omission from the original complaint.289 Thus, these
282. See, e.g., Bostick v. McGuire, No. 6:15-cv-1533-Orl-37GJK, 2016 WL 2811246, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2016); Cooper v. Rhea County, 302 F.R.D. 195, 199 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
283. See, e.g., Mwangi v. Norman, No. 16-cv-000002-CMA-NYW, 2016 WL 7223270, at
*6 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2016); Bender v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 4386(LTS)(GWG),
2015 WL 524283, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015); Lelieve v. Orosa, No. 10-23677-CIV, 2011
WL 5103949, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2011).
284. See, e.g., Haroon v. Talbott, No. 1:16-cv-04720, 2017 WL 4280980, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 27, 2017); White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *18; Smith, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 121.
285. Haroon, 2017 WL 4280980, at *5 (quoting Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S.
538, 550 (2010)).
286. Id. (quoting Krupski, 560 U.S. at 550).
287. Id. at *7.
288. Id.
289. White, 2016 WL 4270152, at *18 (citing Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing
Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2011)).
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courts find that focusing the analysis under Rule 15(c) on the defendant’s
knowledge best harmonizes the Supreme Court’s analysis in Krupski with the
purpose of relation back.290
IV. A BETTER WAY
After Krupski, courts should adopt the approach described in Part III.A.2
and allow relation back for claims against John Doe defendants, provided that
the other requirements of Rule 15(c) are met. This approach is supported by
the text and purpose of Rule 15(c) as well as the Supreme Court’s guidance
in Krupski, and is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
generally.
The majority’s definition of “mistake” as implying a lack of intentionality
that may be inconsistent with the intentional use of John Doe designations is
supported by lay and legal dictionaries.291 Still, such close scrutiny of the
word “mistake,” without broader reference to the other provisions within
Rule 15(c), results in an excessively formalistic interpretation that is not
mandated by the rule’s text.292
As an initial matter, Krupski’s definition of mistake to include “inadequate
knowledge” challenges the majority’s narrow definition.293 Further, by
focusing unnecessarily on the meaning of “mistake,” proponents of the John
Doe rule read into Rule 15(c) a distinction between its mistake requirement
and its knowledge requirement that is unsupported by the text of the Rule.294
The Supreme Court described the central inquiry under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)
as whether the prospective defendant knew or should have known during the
Rule 4(m) period that it would have been named in the original action were
it not for a mistake concerning its identity.295 Wright & Miller’s treatise on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports this interpretation. It describes
Rule 15 has having a “knowledge of mistake” requirement and not a
“knowledge” requirement and a “mistake” requirement.296 Thus, Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is best understood as having a single requirement: the party
to be brought in by amendment knew or should have known that it was not
named in the complaint solely because the plaintiff had inaccurate or
incomplete information concerning its identity. Relatedly, the minority
approach to relation back for claims against John Doe defendants
appropriately recognizes that much of the reasoning upon which continued
application of the John Doe rule relies, both for its definition of mistake and
for its interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), has been undermined by

290. See Haroon, 2017 WL 4280980, at *7.
291. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
292. See Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he text of [Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii)] does not support . . . parsing of the ‘mistake’ language.”).
293. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.
294. Goodman, 494 F.3d at 470–71.
295. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010).
296. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 1498.3.
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Krupski’s rejection of an inquiry under the rule that focuses on what a
plaintiff knew at the time of filing.297
This approach is also better supported by the purpose of Rule 15(c).298
Under the majority’s approach, plaintiffs that lack the knowledge of the
proper party are treated significantly more harshly than those that
misunderstand which party is responsible for their injuries.299 This outcome
does not protect a defendant’s legitimate right to repose, nor is it consistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.300
Policies underlying statutes of limitations are not implicated by an
amendment identifying a previously unidentified party who timely received
sufficient notice of his status as an intended defendant and faces no prejudice
by having not been identified in the original complaint.301 As the Supreme
Court observed in Krupski, “repose would be a windfall for a prospective
defendant who understood, or who should have understood, that he escaped
suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff misunderstood a
crucial fact about his identity.”302 To free intended defendants from the
obligation to defend against potentially meritorious claims solely on the
ground that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of their identities, instead of
misperceiving their identities, overprotects an interest in repose that is neither
warranted nor faithful to the Rules’ preference for resolving disputes on their
merits.303
The majority approach also results in a paradox in which cases with similar
sets of facts reach fundamentally different outcomes. In Wyatt, the court
found that because Wyatt incorrectly named two real but ultimately
uninvolved officers, instead of using fictitious names as placeholders for
defendants whose identities he had not yet discovered, his misidentification
qualified as a “quintessential” mistake under Rule 15(c).304 However, had
Wyatt been aware of his lack of knowledge and named John Doe defendants
instead, his claims would likely have been barred by the statute of
limitations.305 The arbitrariness of this disparity in outcomes is remarkable
given the similarity of the circumstances. In both situations, Wyatt would
have known the identities of some, but not all, of the individuals involved in
his encounter with law enforcement, the only difference being his own
awareness of his lack of knowledge. To dismiss the claims in one instance
while allowing the case to proceed in another clearly seems to constitute a
result based on a technicality, an outcome disfavored by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.306 Further, recognizing a legally significant difference
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
15.
305.
306.

See supra notes 274–80 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 288–90.
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010).
See id.
Wyatt v. Owens, 317 F.R.D. 535, 540–41 (W.D. Va. 2016); see also supra notes 209–
See Wyatt, 317 F.R.D. at 541.
See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).
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between the two situations ultimately requires focusing on the plaintiff’s
knowledge at the time of filing the complaint, which the Supreme Court has
identified as “the wrong starting point.”307
Disparate treatment of such similar situations also creates troubling
incentives for plaintiffs and puts the current interpretation of Rule 15(c) in
tension with Rule 11’s requirement that all factual contentions contained in
a pleading have evidentiary support or are likely to have support after an
opportunity for investigation or discovery.308 Under the majority approach,
it is not unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to conclude that she is better off
naming someone in the original complaint, as opposed to using a John Doe
designation with the hope of discovering the party’s identity, in order to avoid
dismissal of the entire action if she is unable to do so within the limitations
period. While such a pleading violates Rule 11 in that it does not, to the best
of the plaintiff’s knowledge or belief, contain factual allegations supported
by evidence,309 the violation would likely be hard to prove. In this way, the
majority interpretation potentially incentivizes bad faith misidentifications
by punishing plaintiffs who are aware of and candid about their lack of
information, despite their situational similarity with plaintiffs who are
ignorant of their own lack of knowledge. Thus, aside from its tension with
the Supreme Court’s approach to Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure generally, this approach creates incentives for plaintiffs
that run counter to the requirements under Rule 11.
The minority approach to Rule 15(c) also standardizes relation back
doctrine by eliminating the need for various exceptions to the John Doe rule
to avoid inequitable outcomes.310 By focusing the question under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) on the prospective defendant’s knowledge, the minority
approach allows courts to screen claims against John Doe defendants that
should properly be dismissed when the policies underlying statutes of
limitations are implicated through a robust notice inquiry that results in the
dismissal of claims when a prospective defendant reasonably could have
concluded that the plaintiff did not intend to name him in the suit,311 while
allowing claims to proceed when such policies are not implicated.312 Thus,
the minority approach allows courts to reach this outcome through a single,
standardized approach, while the majority does it through a patchwork of
exceptions.313
CONCLUSION
After Krupski, the John Doe rule should be abandoned in favor of an
approach that better balances the competing interests protected by the relation
back doctrine—namely, a defendant’s interest in repose and the Federal
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
Id.
See supra notes 161–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 284–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161–69, 216–18 and accompanying text.
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Rules’ goal of facilitating the disposition of claims on their merits. By
interpreting Rule 15(c) to allow relation back for claims against John Doe
defendants when the other requirements are met, courts can screen claims
against defendants with a legitimate interest in repose, while avoiding the
dismissal of meritorious claims based on a technicality. This approach is
supported by the text and purpose of Rule 15(c) as well as by Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the rule, and it is more consistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure generally.

